Anouncement from Claire Shipman, acting president, Columbia University May 7, 2025

Columbia’s president teaches by example how important are the teachings of the Core Curriculam

St. Augustine and John Locke consider and interpret Claire Shipmant’s statement on the Butler Library disruption, especially its emphasis on disruption, safety, and order.

St. Augustine: On Order, Justice, and the Misplaced Peace

Augustine, in The City of God, famously distinguishes the City of Man —- governed by earthly peace and law —- from the City of God, rooted in higher justice. In his worldview:

• Order imposed by force, without moral legitimacy, is not true peace. It is a fragile substitute.
• Peace is only righteous when ordered toward the good, not merely compliance or calm.

How he might respond:

Augustine would likely see Columbia’s declaration of disruption and enforcement–not through counsel, but through police-—as an echo of the City of Man. Yes, the reading room was seized, chaos ensued, safety jeopardised. But by framing obedience to university rules as the sole yardstick of justice, the statement sacrifices moral ambiguity for institutional tranquility.

• Requesting NYPD to eject students is treated as civic hygiene rather than a moral choice—and thus eerily reminiscent of Augustine’s warnings about institutions substituting order for justice (president.columbia.edu, Jewish Telegraphic Agency).
• The letter’s definition of protest as a violation, rather than political speech, denies dissent its place as an act of conscience.

Augustine would remind us: True order serves the soul’s orientation to divine justice—even when it disrupts peace.

John Locke: On Liberty, Consent, and the Limits of Authority

John Locke, whose political philosophy underpins much of modern liberal thought, holds:

• Authority is legitimate only when framed through consent and the common good.
• Punishments must be proportionate and focused on harm—not mere disruption.
• Penal responses should be civil and rehabilitative, not assumptive or coercive.

How he might assess Claire Shipman’s language:

Locke would likely applaud the university’s intention to maintain study space and safety—but he’d critique the infraction-based logic and mass sanctions:

• The phrase “violation of University policies” is repeatedly used as if the rules themselves were beyond contest, rather than subject to communal political judgment (president.columbia.edu, communications.news.columbia.edu).
• Sanctions spanning suspensions, expulsions, and degree revocations raise Locke’s concern: Does disruption equate moral culpability or harm? The risk is imbalanced punitive measures without nuanced deliberation — not a system built on proportional justice. Reuters, JTA, Al Jazeera report how sanctions were broad and mass-applied (reuters.com).
• Locke would question the legitimacy of collective punishment when individual motives vary—some participants may have engaged peacefully, others out of conscience.
• The absence of an accountability structure beyond administrative decision-making (no mention of democratic faculty-student consultation or appeal processes beyond internal board) would disturb him. Process must always remain open to challenge, especially when rights are curtailed.

Finally

Both thinkers would share unease: that in the name of preserving order, Columbia’s leadership has constructed a narrative where policy violation replaces ethical reflection— and punishment replaces dialogue and consent. Whether divine order (Augustine) or social contract (Locke), each would demand that authority be exercised not merely to suppress, but to reflect and rehabilitate the moral life of the community.